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Abstract 
This article explores the concept of the automatic unfair 
dismissal that is regulated in s 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), where the reason for the dismissal is to 
"compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any 
matter of mutual interest". This provision raised important 
questions of law, as it brought to the fore the conflict that 
existed between this provision and sections 188(1)(a)(ii) and 
189 of the LRA, which permits dismissals for operational 
requirements. This dichotomy was dealt with by the court in 
Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
2003 ILJ 133 (LAC), but the decision was controversial and 
faced criticism. The decision of the court was consequently 
rendered incorrect, resulting in the amendment to s 187(1)(c), 
which now reads that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the 
reason for the dismissal is a refusal by employees to accept a 
demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
them and their employer. However, it is doubtful whether the 
amended provision provides a solution to the contradiction that 
exists. Resultantly, this article seeks to critique the amendment 
and to make recommendations regarding the regulation of this 
part of labour law. 
Keywords 
Amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA); automatic 
unfair dismissal; dismissal on grounds of operational 
requirements; disputes of interest; disputes of right. 
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1 Introduction 
The section of labour law where the definition of "automatically unfair 
dismissal",1 the employer's right to terminate contracts of employment on 
the ground of operational requirements2 and the institution of collective 
bargaining overlap, creates controversial legal ground.3 
After South Africa's first democratic elections, the Cheadle Task Team 
included the definition of an "automatic unfair dismissal" in the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 ("the LRA of 1995"). This section stated that it 
constitutes an "automatic unfair dismissal" "if the reason for dismissal is to 
compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest".4 
A barrage of criticism was levelled against the way in which this definition 
of the LRA of 1995 was interpreted by the Labour Appeal Court5 ("the 
LAC") and the Supreme Court of Appeal6 ("the SCA") in the Fry's Metals 
cases.7 On 1 January 2015 the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 
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1  Section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the LRA of 
1995). 
2  Section 188(1)(a)(i) of the LRA of 1995. 
3  The seeds of uncertainty were already sown during the era of the Industrial Court 
("the IC"). It grappled with the boundaries of the concepts of "lock-out dismissals" 
and "collective bargaining". See Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v 
Game Discount World Ltd 1990 ILJ 162 (IC). 
4  Section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. 
5  Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 2003 ILJ 133 (LAC) 
(hereafter Fry's Metals, LAC). 
6  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd 2005 ILJ 689 
(SCA) (hereafter Fry's Metals, SCA). Also see the cases in which the Fry's Metals 
cases are referred to, including Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) 
Ltd 2003 ILJ 1917 (LAC) (hereafter the Algorax case); General Food Industries Ltd v 
Food and Allied Workers Union 2004 ILJ 1260 (LAC); and Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v 
National Union of Mineworkers 2004 ILJ 2156 (LAC). 
7  So, for example, Thompson 2006 ILJ 730 argues for the removal of the statutory 
"prohibition against tactical and temporary dismissals from the category of 
automatically unfair dismissals" as it "simply does not belong there and spawns 
anomalies". In the alternative, he argues that policy-makers could consider 
amending the LRA of 1995 to prohibit permanent economic terminations expressly, 
but to make allowance for employers to employ replacement labour during offensive 
lock-outs. Grogan 2003 ELJ 11 continues that it "seems somewhat strange that the 
legislature should have categorised conditional dismissals in the context of collective 
bargaining as automatically unfair". Also see Qotoyi and Van Der Walt 2009 Obiter 
79.  
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2014 ("the LRAA of 2014") came into effect and, amongst other things, it 
aimed to clarify the situation surrounding automatic unfair dismissal, 
operational requirement dismissals and collective bargaining.8 The authors 
argue that it is doubtful that the amendment of section 187(1)(c) of the 
LRA of 1995 provides the appropriate solution to the on-going 
contradictions referred to below. This contribution seeks to unravel this 
minefield of uncertainty, to critique the recent amendment and to make 
recommendations regarding the regulation of this aspect of labour law. 
2 Salient aspects of the LRA 
The LRA of 1995 does not contain an enforceable duty to engage in 
collective bargaining.9 Despite this, section 1 of the LRA of 1995 in no 
uncertain terms promotes collective bargaining as the means by which 
"wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual 
interest" should be determined.10 Collective bargaining is also bolstered in 
so far as trade unions are accorded organisational rights11 and there is an 
unambiguous recognition of the right to strike.12 
During the process of collective bargaining the dismissal of workers is 
prohibited when it aims to force workers to agree to changes of conditions 
of service.13 Simply put, these disputes should be resolved though 
collective bargaining and power-play and not through threats of dismissal. 
When workers engage in strike action, employers have the recourse to 
lock-out in response to a strike, and to employ replacement labour.14 
However, they are not at liberty to take the initiative in forcing the issue of 
amending conditions of service by dismissing workers who do not accept 
the demand,15 or by means of an offensive or attacking lock-out and the 
employment of replacement labour.16 This is the framework established for 
the resolution of collective bargaining disputes. 
                                            
8  The Memorandum of Objects: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 17 alludes to 
the fact that the LRA of 1995 "is amended to remove an anomaly arising from the 
interpretation of s 187(1)(c) in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry's Metals 
(Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA)". 
9  Vettori 2005 De Jure 382.  
10  Section 1 of the LRA of 1995. 
11  Sections 11-16 of the LRA of 1995. 
12  Section 64(1) of the LRA of 1995. 
13  Section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. 
14  See SACTWU v Stuttafords Department Stores Ltd 1999 ILJ 2692 (LC); Stuttafords 
Department Stores Ltd v SACTWU 2001 1 BLLR 46 (LAC). 
15  Section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. 
16 Section 76(1)(b) of the LRA of 1995. Ntimane v Agrinet 1999 3 BLLR 248 (LC). 
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Despite this neat structure, there is a dichotomy in the LRA of 1995 in so 
far as the employer retains the right to terminate workers' employment on 
the grounds of economic reasons as long as this is in line with the canons 
of fairness. The LRA of 1995 recognises three reasons, subject to 
appropriate procedures being followed, which could potentially constitute a 
fair dismissal.17 These are the employee's conduct, the employee's 
capacity, and the employer's operational requirements.18 The notion 
"operational requirements" is defined in broad terms. It covers 
requirements based on "the economic, technological, structural or similar 
needs of an employer".19 While it is impossible to define all the 
circumstances that might legitimately form the basis of a dismissal for this 
reason, the Code on Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements states 
that economic reasons are those that relate to the "financial management 
of the enterprise", technological reasons to "the introduction of new 
technology which affects work relationships", and structural reasons those 
that "relate to the redundancy of posts consequent to a restructuring of the 
employer's enterprise".20 
Such terminations are often associated with the economic subsistence of 
the employer. For some time before the Fry's Metals cases, the courts 
showed a willingness to adopt a more interventionist approach and to 
scrutinise the reasons for the decision to dismiss. In Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union v Algorax21 ("Algorax") it was the approach of the LAC 
that retrenchment comes as a measure of last resort rather than merely 
relying on the "say-so" of the employer. Differently stated, the employer 
should usually have its proverbial back against the wall to prove 
substantive fairness before terminating the employment of a portion of the 
workforce. Nonetheless, this is not always the case. Even though it may 
appear a drastic norm, it is also an accepted South African legal principle 
that employers are at liberty to reduce the number of workers to increase 
profits.22 
                                            
17  Section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. 
18  Section 188(1) of the LRA of 1995. See further Schedule 8 (Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal) item 2(2), which directs that the LRA of 1995 "recognises three grounds 
on which a termination might be legitimate. These are: the conduct of the employee, 
the capacity of the employee, and the operational requirements of the employer's 
business". 
19  Section 213 of the LRA of 1995. 
20  Item 1 of the Code on Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements (Gen N 1517 
in GG 20254 of 16 July 1999). Also see Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 473.  
21  2003 ILJ 1917 (LAC). Also see Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work 315 and the 
discussion of the Algorax case by Du Toit 2005 ILJ 598-602. 
22  See Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2004 ILJ 2156 (LAC). 
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In addition, an employer must in terms of section 189 of the LRA of 1995, 
when contemplating the dismissal of workers on operational grounds, 
"engage in a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process" with workers' 
representatives to consider "alternatives that the employer considered", 
which could potentially limit or avoid the dismissals.23 This could include 
the working of short time, the lowering of salaries and other amendments 
to conditions of service. Failing agreement, the employer retains the right 
to terminate the contracts of employment on the grounds of operational 
requirements. Subsequent to this, if contested, it is left to arbitrators or 
judges to determine whether or not such dismissals are substantively and 
procedurally fair. The problem is that when an employer contemplates 
adapting its workers' conditions of service during operational requirements 
consultations, the parties could potentially enter the realm of collective 
bargaining, and employers are not supposed to dismiss workers to force 
them to accept a demand. 
Strikes and lock-outs form an integral part of the process of collective 
bargaining. During industrial action employers and workers are engaged in 
concerted actions which have as their ideal the attainment of a collective 
agreement which spells out the changed conditions of employment. The 
definitions of "strike" and "lock-out" in terms of the LRA of 1995 limit these 
types of actions to so-called disputes of "mutual interest".24 This ensures 
that strikes and lock-out do not coincide with claims, such as political 
disputes, about which the employer has limited ability to influence the 
outcome.25 
The term "mutual interest" is not defined in the LRA of 1995. However, the 
courts have given the term a wide meaning.26 In De Beers Consolidated 
Mines v CCMA27 it was held that the term must be interpreted literally to 
mean "any issue concerning employment".28 The broadness of the 
concept is aptly captured by Thompson as follows: 
In some labour law systems, it is accurate to speak of business matters over 
which the unions have no say. That is not the case in South Africa. A union 
can push for a collective agreement on any matter of mutual interest 
between employer and employee, and it can engage in a protected strike on 
                                            
23  Sections 189(2)-(3) of the LRA of 1995. 
24  Section 213 of the LRA of 1995. 
25  Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work 444. 
26  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 285. See further Van Niekerk and Smit 
Law@work 445.  
27  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 5 BLLR 578 (LC). 
28  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 5 BLLR 578 (LC) para 16. 
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anything impacting on the employment relationship. No employer decision 
bearing on employment is immune from industrial or legal challenge.29 
Even though the LRA of 1995 does not make such a distinction, labour law 
scholars often differentiate between disputes of interest and disputes of 
right. As pointed out by Van Niekerk and Smit, the notion dispute of mutual 
interest is wide enough to include both of these categories of disputes.30 
Interest disputes involve the creation of new rights or the adaptation of 
existing rights.31 This differs from a dispute of right, which concerns a legal 
claim under an employment contract, a collective agreement, a statute or 
even the common law. In such instances the dispute concerns a breach of 
a pre-existing right.32 
The importance of this classification lies in the mechanisms available to 
address these varying disputes. Strikes and lock-outs are generally not an 
option in relation to the resolution of disputes of right, as such matters 
must be finalised through arbitration or adjudication. The LRA of 1995 
provides that no person may strike or lock-out "if the issue in dispute is 
one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or the Labour Court" for 
resolution in terms of the LRA of 1995.33 Conversely so, a dispute of 
interest must be resolved by means of the bargaining process itself.34 
Against this backdrop, a variation to terms and conditions of employment 
would mostly locate itself within the realm of interest disputes and hence 
the mechanism of collective bargaining would be the appropriate 
                                            
29  Thompson 1999 ILJ 758-759. 
30  Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work 445 allude to the fact that a "dispute about a 
matter of mutual interest should not be equated with an interest dispute – these are 
very different concepts. Interest disputes, like rights disputes, when they arise in the 
context of an employment relationship, are subsets of the broader category of 
disputes about matters of mutual interest. In other words, disputes about 'matters of 
mutual interest' include disputes of right as well as disputes of interest". 
31  This was confirmed in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd 
2001 ILJ 701 (LC) para 25 (hereafter Fry's Metals, LC). Also see Cohen 2004 ILJ 
1884-1885. The author states that "[p]roposed changes to terms and conditions of 
employment can be classified as an interest dispute, being a dispute in which the 
claimant party seeks a benefit or advantage to which he has no legal entitlement. In 
terms of the LRA 1995, interest disputes are intended to be resolved through the 
collective bargaining process". 
32  Thompson 1999 ILJ 757 confirms that the "starting-point is the reminder that our 
system works explicitly with the distinction between disputes of right and disputes of 
interest". Notwithstanding this, the distinction is not always absolute. Van Niekerk 
and Smit Law@work 446 mentions that this "is not a clean distinction – there are at 
least two categories of dispute where parties have a choice of either arbitration or 
adjudication on the one hand or industrial action on the other. These are disputes 
about organisational rights and disputes about whether there is a fair reason for a 
dismissal on account of the employer's operational requirements". 
33  Section 65(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. 
34  Thompson 1999 ILJ 757-758. 
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remedy.35 On the other hand, the dismissal of workers on operational 
grounds would be classified a dispute of right, and arbitration or 
adjudication would be the appropriate process to resolve such disputes. 
As a general rule, the LRA of 1995 prohibits the dismissal of workers 
engaged in protected strike action. The LRA of 1995 confirms this by 
providing that "an employer may not dismiss an employee for participating 
in a strike" or, for that matter, "for any conduct … in the furtherance of a 
protected strike".36 This section is bolstered by the inclusion of the 
prohibition of automatically unfair dismissals, which is discussed below. 
However, there is an exception to the rule. Employers are permitted in the 
course of a strike to dismiss employees based on operational reasons. 
Section 67(5) provides that subsection (4) does not limit: 
… an employer from fairly dismissing an employee in accordance with 
Chapter VIII … during the strike … for a reason based on the employer's 
operational requirements. 
These provisions clash. We say this because on the one hand an 
employer may terminate workers' employment for operational reasons 
during strikes in terms of section 67(5) of the LRA of 1995. However, on 
the other hand the employer may not terminate its workers' employment to 
compel the employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest in terms of the automatic unfair dismissal provisions in 
terms of section 187(1) of the LRA of 1995.37 
3 Understanding the dichotomy 
The starting point of our argument is that there may be legitimate 
circumstances that require the terms and conditions of employment to be 
changed in order to maintain the viability of the employer's business. As 
fittingly stated by Thompson:  
In a market economy driven by competition, change is a fact of life. 
Businesses must adapt constantly to stay in the game, and this entails 
ongoing changes to terms and conditions of employment. Everyone has an 
                                            
35  Collective agreements which are the product of collective bargaining are defined in s 
213 of the LRA of 1995 as written agreements concerning terms and conditions of 
employment or any other matter of mutual interest. The LRA of 1995 further provides 
for the right to strike, strike being defined in s 213 as the partial or complete 
concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who 
are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the 
purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee. 
36  Section 67(4) of the LRA of 1995. 
37  This principle was confirmed by the LAC in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 
1999 ILJ 1718 (LAC) para 29. 
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interest in the continuing progress of individual firms and the economy as a 
whole.38 
However, when it comes to making these changes, the employer's legal 
options are limited.39 Due to the fact that the amendment of working 
conditions of service falls into the basket of interest disputes, consensus is 
generally required before changes may be made, which is not always 
possible to attain through power play. The only tool available to the 
employer is that of a retaliatory lock-out to force workers to accept the 
employer's demand to amend conditions of service.40 An employer may 
not take into employment any person to perform the work of any employee 
who is locked out, unless the lock-out is in response to a strike.41 
However, as pointed out by Mischke:  
[even though] the employer may contemplate exercising its economic power 
in the form of a lock out – [it is] hardly the most appropriate course of action 
for an employer already perhaps facing considerable economic pressure. 
The resulting loss of production and the fall-out of a lock-out may very well 
constitute the last straw for a struggling employer.42 
Furthermore, section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995, previously determined  
[a] dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is to 
compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between the employer and employee. 
Notwithstanding the mechanism of collective bargaining as espoused in 
the LRA of 1995, as well as the protection provided by section 187(1)(c) of 
the LRA, there have been instances in which employers have resorted to 
the dismissal of employees after a rejection of proposed changes to terms 
and conditions of employment.43 In such instances the employer's 
assertion has been that the proposed changes were necessary for 
operational reasons.44 However, what has caused much controversy is the 
question of whether these dismissals for operational requirements amount 
to unfair dismissals. 
                                            
38  Thompson 2006 ILJ 705. 
39  Mischke 2003 CLL 31. 
40  A "lock-out" is loosely defined in s 213 of the LRA of 1995 as the exclusion by an 
employer of employees from the workplace for the purpose of compelling the 
employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
employer and employee, whether or not the employer breaches those employees' 
contracts of employment in the course of, or for the purpose of, that exclusion. 
41  Section 76(1)(b) of the LRA of 1995. 
42  Mischke 2003 CLL 32. 
43  Relying on s 188(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA of 1995. 
44  Such as Fry's Metals, LAC; Fry's Metals, SCA; Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Mineworkers 2004 ILJ 2156 (LAC) and the Algorax case. 
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What follows is an examination of the decisions by the LAC and SCA in 
the Fry's Metals cases and the amendment that has been made to section 
187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. 
This is an important matter. As stated by Thompson, these are not 
"abstract concepts" but are very significant issues for both workers and 
employers. It is important to understand "just how does the law conceive 
of the contest" when the interests of parties conflict, and "on what basis 
will matters be decided should the parties go to court".45 
We contend that this question remains relevant ten years later. As 
discussed below, the section has been tweaked by the LRAA of 2014. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the legal issues have been 
resolved. 
4  Prelude to Fry's Metals: the lock-out dismissal 
The key to understanding the Fry's Metals decisions and the recent 
amendment to the LRA of 1995 lies in the wording of the definition of 
"lock-out" in terms of the former Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 ("the 
LRA of 1956") and the interpretation of fair and unfair bargaining tactics by 
the IC. A "lock-out" was defined as: 
any one or more of the following acts or omissions by a person who is or has 
been an employer – …… 
(c)  the breach or termination by him of the contracts of employment of any body 
… in his employ; or  
(d) the refusal … by him to re-employ any body … who have been in his 
employ, 
if the purpose of that … breach, termination, refusal or failure is to induce or 
compel any persons, who are or have been in his employ … – 
(i) to agree or comply with any demands or proposals concerning 
terms or conditions of employment.46 
The definition had a wide meaning and included the "termination" of 
employment as long as it was associated with the purpose of persuading 
workers to accept a demand. If this criterion was met, the action fell within 
the realm of lock-outs. This, in turn, formed part of the "acceptable" 
process of the amendment of conditions of service, which falls within the 
arenas of power-play and disputes of interest. 
The IC had wide powers to impose a duty to engage in collective 
bargaining within the realm of its role as watchdog under the LRA of 1956, 
                                            
45  Thompson 2006 ILJ 704. 
46  Section 1 of the LRA of 1956. Own emphasis added.  
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and it established the boundaries of good and bad faith industrial action.47 
So, for example, the IC in Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union 
of SA v Game Discount World Ltd48 confirmed the principle that temporary 
or tactical dismissals fell within the statutory definition of lock-outs. 
According to the IC such dismissals potentially had as their goal the 
purpose of persuading workers to accept a demand and were therefore 
immune to unfair labour practice scrutiny. However, it was deemed 
unacceptable to import the "final and irrevocable" dismissal, which did not 
advance collective bargaining, into the definition of lock-out.49 
Consequently, the IC concluded that the final retrenchment of workers was 
unfair as it did not advance collective bargaining. On the other hand, it did 
permit temporary tactical dismissals as part of the collective bargaining 
process. 
In an attempt to limit employees' actions and omissions covered in the 
shadows of lock-outs and operational dismissals, the then new LRA of 
1995's definition of lock-out was amended by removing all reference to 
dismissals.50 The definition now applies only to: 
… the exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer's 
workplace, for the purpose of compelling employees to accept a demand.51 
The LRA of 1995's definition of "lock-out" now apparently restricts 
employers' collective bargaining tools which could be used to strong-arm 
workers to accept a demand. The current definition also has the effect of 
expanding the CCMA and Labour Court's ("the LC") powers to find such 
dismissals, which do not fall within the realms of interest disputes, 
                                            
47  National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd 1991 ILJ 
1221 (A); Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Ministerial Legal Task Team 
1995 ILJ 278, 289-299; Vettori 2005 De Jure 382. 
48  Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Game Discount World Ltd 1990 
ILJ 162 (IC). Also see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Aerial King Sales 
(Pty) (Ltd) 1994 ILJ 1384 (IC).  
49  Thompson 2006 ILJ 727 mentions that the IC cases confirmed that temporarily 
dismissing employees "to induce compliance with an industrial demand was immune 
from unfair labour practice scrutiny, and in fact doing no worse than engaging in 
legitimate power-play". The cases "went on to strike down the cardinal sin of the 
time: the so-called 'termination lock-out' – permanent dismissals which employers 
wanted to smuggle into the protected lock-out stockade". 
50  As aptly pointed out by the highest court in Ex Parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 ILJ 821 (CC) 841 in "South Africa the lock-out has been the 
subject of elastic statutory definition. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, the 
lock-out was given wide definition to include a range of employer conduct aimed at 
compelling workers' agreement, including … the dismissal of workers. The new 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 … gives a much more restricted definition of lock-
out". 
51  Section 213 of the LRA of 1995. 
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automatically unfair. As previously mentioned, section 187(1)(c) of the 
LRA of 1995 until the end of 2014 stated that it constitutes an automatic 
unfair dismissal should "the reason for the dismissal" of an employee be 
"to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest". 
Disappointingly, policy makers failed to clarify the description of 
automatically unfair dismissal by explaining whether it aimed to proscribe: 
all dismissals associated with collective bargaining, only permanent 
dismissals as it was done by the IC, or the previously acceptable tactical 
dismissal of employees during the process of collective bargaining. This 
was an oversight and gave rise to the ensuing debate. 
5 Fry's Metals: Interpreting the former section 187(1)(c) 
In the Fry's Metals cases the employer's viability was placed under 
pressure by prevailing economic conditions. It sought to change conditions 
of service relating to its workers' shift system to ensure its survival. The 
employees rejected the proposed changes and the employer responded 
by notifying its workers that those who did not accept the amendments 
would be retrenched. This resulted in the applicant employees 
approaching the labour courts for an order interdicting the respondent 
employer from dismissing the employees. 
In Fry's Metals, LC52 Francis AJ considered two questions in determining 
whether the dismissal constituted an automatically unfair dismissal. The 
first was whether the proposed changes constituted a "matter of mutual 
interest" as contemplated in the LRA of 1995 definition of automatically 
unfair labour practice. The second was whether the company's insistence 
on a new shift system sought to compel the employees to accept a 
demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest or, in the alternative, 
whether the company could legitimately implement the new shift system 
for operational reasons.53 
The LC answered the first question in the affirmative, holding that the 
dispute involved "the creation of new rights or the diminution of existing 
rights" as per the conception of disputes of mutual interest.54 Having 
passed this hurdle, Francis J proceeded to find that the respondent had 
sought to avoid having to follow the path of conciliation and a subsequent 
lock-out to persuade the workers to accept its proposals. It elected to 
                                            
52  National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd 2001 ILJ 701 (LC). 
53  Fry's Metals, LC paras 19-20. 
54  Fry's Metals, LC para 28. 
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conduct a lock-out dismissal and disguised it as a retrenchment which 
constituted an automatically unfair dismissal.55 The LC concluded that:  
In the circumstances, the negotiations are seen as falling within what 
Professor Thompson calls the "wage work bargain" and as such I am 
reluctant to allow the dispute to escape the protected zone of collective 
bargaining in which dismissals of the present sort ought never to be 
permitted.56 
On appeal the LAC followed a more nuanced, but problematic approach. 
Its main consideration was whether or not employers have a right to 
dismiss employees who are not prepared to agree to changes of their 
conditions of employment, when such changes are necessary for the 
viability, or improvement, of the employer's business. Zondo JP launched 
an enquiry into the relationship between the right to resort to retrenchment 
to survive or to improve profits, on the one hand, and on the other, an 
employee's right implicit in section 187(1)(c) not to be dismissed with the 
specific "purpose" of being compelled to agree to a demand in respect of a 
matter of mutual interest.57 
As the point of departure, the LAC accepted that there can be no doubt 
that section 188(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA of 1995 gives employers the right to 
dismiss workers for a reason based on its operational requirements.58 
Zondo JP accorded a wide meaning to operational requirements 
dismissals and rejected the contention that the "survival of the business" is 
the sole criterion of substantive fairness.59 In principle, he held, an 
employer may also dismiss "if it is making profit and wants to make more 
profit".60 However, the LAC accepted that the conundrum comes in when, 
in terminating employees' contracts of employment, the employer is 
exercising his or her right to dismiss for operational reasons as opposed to 
                                            
55  Fry's Metals, LC para 51 states that on the "facts of this matter, the employer clearly 
has invoked the threat of dismissal, in the guise of retrenchment, as a direct negative 
inducement to employees to abandon their reluctance to accept the new shift 
system. The threat of retrenchment of those employees who did not accede to the 
respondent's demand was made at a point in the negotiations where an impasse had 
been reached on these demands and was clearly prompted by the impasse. Before 
reaching this impasse in the negotiations, the respondent had no intention of, and 
had not contemplated, dismissing the employees". 
56  Fry's Metals, LC para 54.  
57  Fry's Metals, LAC para 1. 
58  Fry's Metals, LAC para 22 emphasises ss 188(1)(a)(ii) and 67(5) of the LRA of 1995. 
The definition of "operational requirements" in s 213 of the LRA of 1995 is also 
scrutinised. 
59  Fry's Metals, LAC paras 32-33. 
60  Fry's Metals, LAC paras 32-33. 
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dismissing in order to compel the employees to accept a demand as part 
of collective bargaining.61 
In a somewhat surprising development, the LAC did not find a conflict in 
the automatically unfair dismissal and operational requirement provisions 
of the LRA of 1995. Rather than merely interpreting the sections of the 
LRA of 1995 as it stood, the LAC chose to second guess policy makers by 
finding that the prohibition contained in section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 
1995 was based on the LRA of 1956's historical definition of the term lock-
out, and Zondo JP relied on the decisions of the IC which delineated 
acceptable and unacceptable lock-out dismissals in the wake of collective 
bargaining. 
However, this is where the LAC became misdirected. With reference to the 
IC's earlier judgment in Game Discount World62 the LAC first confirmed 
that under the old dispensation, for a dismissal to fall within the useful 
collective bargaining zone of the definition of a "lock-out", the dismissal 
had to have the purpose of compelling workers to accept a demand. In 
other words, it had to be temporary or strategic in nature to be protected. 
This, Zondo JP reasoned, was what the LRA of 1995 sought to prohibit 
under the auspices of automatic unfair dismissals.63 
The LAC further reasoned that, due to the fact that final retrenchments, 
such as in this matter, did not fall under the former definition of lock-out, 
the Court was at liberty to hold that such terminations could be brought 
under permissible operational requirement dismissals under section 188 of 
the LRA of 1995.64  
With reference to dismissal on the grounds of operational requirements, 
Zondo JP explained that the purpose of such terminations is to get rid of 
employees who do not meet the business requirements of the employer, 
so that new employees who will meet the business requirements can be 
employed.65 As such, the LAC found a distinct difference between an 
                                            
61  Fry's Metals, LAC para 23. 
62  Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Game Discount World Ltd 1990 
ILJ 162 (IC). 
63  Fry's Metals, LAC paras 27. 
64  Fry's Metals, LAC para 28 concluded that an employee's acceptance of an 
employer's demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest can be useful or worth 
anything only if the employee is going to continue in the employer's employ. The 
reason for this is that after an employee is finally dismissed, no employment 
relationship exists between the parties. 
65  Fry's Metals, LAC para 30. 
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automatically unfair dismissal and a dismissal based on operational 
requirements.66 The former is prohibited, and the latter is not. 
In our opinion the LAC decision was wrong for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the post-constitutional LRA of 1995's definition of lock-out was 
amended to exclude all forms of dismissal. It was, therefore, inappropriate 
for Zondo JP to continue relying on the IC decisions which related to the 
dividing line between the permissible and impermissible types of dismissal 
in the new era. Secondly, the Game Discount World case concluded that 
permanent dismissals were unfair in the context of collective bargaining, 
but that strategic dismissals were acceptable. Had the facts of the Fry's 
Metal case been considered by the IC it would undoubtedly have made an 
adverse finding against the employer in so far as the final dismissals 
would have eroded the institution of collective bargaining. Third, it is 
inconceivable that the LAC could find only the lesser form of termination - 
the strategic one, where workers could still potentially retain their jobs if 
they were to give in to the demands of the employer - to be covered by the 
definition of automatic unfair dismissal, but not irreversible retrenchments. 
The acceptance of this argument undermines the very structure of 
collective bargaining, and it is contended that it is highly unlikely that the 
legislature intended section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995 to have such an 
effect. 
This steered the LAC to conclude that the protection against automatically 
unfair dismissals applied to any dismissal that was the result of the failure 
by the affected employees to accept a demand made by the employer 
relating to an aspect of mutual interest to the employer and the 
employees. However, the LAC excluded from the ambit of protection a 
decision by an employer which finally terminates contracts of employment 
as part of a retrenchment exercise.67 
The Fry's Metals cases reached finality in the SCA in 2005.68 Mpati DP 
and Cameron JA recognised the fact that competing interests are 
                                            
66  According to the LAC Fry's Metals, LAC para 31 the distinction is made as follows: 
Either the dismissal is effected in order to compel the employees to agree to the 
employer's demand, and the dismissal would be withdrawn and the employees 
retained if they accept the demand, or the dismissal is final so that, in a case like this 
one, the employer may replace the employees permanently with employees who are 
prepared to work under the terms and conditions that meet the employer's 
requirements. 
67  Fry's Metals, LAC para 27 held that "what was said by the Industrial Court in Game 
Discount World in respect of a lock-out dismissal under the definition of a lock-out 
under the old Act, namely, that such a dismissal cannot be final and irrevocable, 
applies with equal force to the provisions of s 187(1)(c) of the Act". 
68  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd 2005 ILJ 689 
(SCA). 
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protected by the LRA of 1995. While it is one of the primary aims of the 
LRA of 1995 to protect and encourage collective bargaining between 
workers and employers69 it does on the other hand permit employers to 
effect changes to conditions of service justified by operational 
requirements.70 The SCA scrutinised what they referred to as an 
"influential article" by Thompson alluded to above but rejected his line of 
reasoning. In his article, Thompson bases his argument on the premise 
that the LRA of 1995's framework is based on a distinction between 
disputes of right and disputes of interest. He reasons that dismissals on 
the ground of operational requirements should never be permitted in the 
arena of collective bargaining to coerce workers to accept a demand. 
However, it is permissible only in respect of disputes of business 
restructuring where the viability of the business is at stake. In this category 
of operational requirements dismissals, which are rights based, there is an 
overlap with collective bargaining or interest based disputes. He further 
suggests that only in instances where a dispute has "migrated", from the 
collective bargaining to the rights based domain should it be permissible to 
dismiss workers.71 However, he argues that this should not be permitted 
randomly and effortlessly. The courts should scrutinise the issue on a 
case-by-case basis, and only where an employer could show a 
"demonstrably sensible business analysis" that the dismissal is acceptable 
where a dispute had drifted from the domain of interest to rights 
disputes.72 
The SCA rejected Thompson's arguments and Mpati DP and Cameron JA 
reasoned that: 
The core difficulty with this argument is that the dichotomy between matters of 
mutual interest and questions of "right" do not in our view form the basis of the 
collective bargaining structure that the statute has adopted. The unavoidable 
complexities that arise from the supposed "migration" of matters of mutual 
interest to matters of "right" demonstrate in our view that the dichotomy does 
not form the basis of the statutory structure, and s 187(1)(c) cannot, 
accordingly, be interpreted as if the legislation proceeds from that premise.73 
The SCA concluded by supporting the LAC decision in so far as the 
enquiry into section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995 should start with the 
                                            
69  Fry's Metals, SCA. It was confirmed (para 52) that on "the other hand the statute is 
at pains to erect a system that scrupulously protects and encourages collective 
bargaining between workers and employers, so as to facilitate the conclusion of 
collective agreements, which are defined as written agreements concerning terms 
and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest". 
70  Fry's Metals, SCA para 51. The SCA refers to ss 67, 188 and 189 of the LRA of 
1995. 
71  Fry's Metals, SCA para 51. Reference is made to Thompson 1999 ILJ 770. 
72  Fry's Metals, SCA para 51. Reference is made to Thompson 1999 ILJ 770. 
73  Fry's Metals, SCA para 54. 
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meaning of "dismissal" which permits termination, with or without notice, 
on the grounds of misconduct and operational requirements.74 According 
to the SCA, the "two categories do not overlap" as there is a difference 
between such dismissals and automatically unfair dismissals, which must 
be effected for the purpose of compelling employees to accept a 
demand.75 In this instance the employer sought to dismiss employees on 
operational grounds and the application for leave to appeal was 
dismissed. 
The decision of the SCA is open to the same criticism as that levelled 
against the LAC decision to which we alluded to above. However, in 
addition, we have two main points of criticism against Mpati DP and 
Cameron JA's judgment. Firstly, the SCA was misdirected in finding no 
contradiction, or at least an eroding effect, between the statutory 
provisions which permit dismissal on the grounds of operational 
requirements and terminations by reason of compelling employees to 
accede to an employer's demand. We agree with Thompson that there are 
grey areas where operational requirement dismissals and strategic 
dismissals which form part of collective bargaining overlap. This is so, 
particularly where an employer has its proverbial back against the wall and 
is fighting for its financial survival. Rather than admitting that such a 
shadowy area exists, and assuming the responsibility of evaluating on a 
case-by-case basis where there are substantive reasons to endorse such 
dismissal, the SCA stuck to the structured divide between strategic and 
permanent dismissals. The SCA also completely missed the point made in 
the Game Discount World case in which it was held that permanent 
dismissals ought to be prohibited on the ground of unfairness and that 
temporary dismissals could be acceptable.  
Secondly, the SCA erred by contending that the structure of the LRA of 
1995 has nothing to do with the divide between disputes of interest and 
disputes of right. Yes, the LRA of 1995 does not specifically employ the 
terms disputes of "interest" and questions of "right", but there can be no 
doubt that the broad dispute resolution structure is grounded on the 
resolution of interest disputes through collective bargaining, strikes and 
lock-outs, and disputes of right through arbitration and adjudication. It is no 
coincidence that section 65(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995 provides that: 
(1) No person may take part in a strike or lock-out … if … 
                                            
74  "Dismissal" is defined in s 186(1) of the LRA of as meaning, among other things, that 
"(a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice". 
75  Fry's Metals, SCA para 55. 
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(c) the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to 
arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of the Act. 
Notwithstanding our reservations about the Fry's Metals decisions, these 
precedents had a substantial effect and following in subsequent labour 
jurisprudence.76 The situation remained unchanged until the 
implementation of the LRAA of 2014 on 1 January 2015. 
6  The Labour Relations Amendment Act of 2014 
6.1 Amendment to section 187(1)(c) 
In an attempt to remedy the incongruities referred to above, the LRAA of 
2014 amended section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995 to read that:  
… a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason is a refusal by employees 
to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between them 
and their employer. 
The only difference between the previous definition and the current 
definition is that the old section's words, "to compel the employee to 
accept a demand", have been replaced by the phrase "is a refusal by 
employees to accept a demand". 
The Memorandum of Objects: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012, 
which gives background to the LRAA of 2014, does not clarify what policy 
considerations underlie the amendment. It fails to explain whether the 
amendment has as a purpose to extend the scope of automatic unfair 
                                            
76  In addition to older cases such as Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of 
Mineworkers 2004 ILJ 2156 (LAC) and Algorax, later cases continue to endorse the 
principles laid down in Fry's Metals. See, for example, BEMAWU obo Mohapi v Clear 
Channel Independent (Pty) Ltd 2010 ILJ 2863 (LC) paras 26-29. The LC held that 
there "seems to be no doubt that an employer can in law utilise the principles of 
operational requirements to terminate the employment of an employee who refuses 
to accept the changes to terms and conditions of employment. However, a dismissal 
based on operational requirements would be automatically unfair if no valid 
operational requirements exist to justify changes and also as indicated earlier the 
dismissal is not final and intended to replace an employee with those who may be 
willing to accept the changes in the conditions of employment". In a similar fashion, 
the LC in Solidarity obo Wehncke v Surf4cars (Pty) Ltd 2011 ILJ 3037 (LC) para 11. 
The LC held that "even if the conditions attaching to company car usage had 
amounted to an alteration of the applicant's orally agreed terms of employment, his 
dismissal was not conditional in the narrow sense meant by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Fry's Metals. Nothing in the applicant's statement of case … shows that 
the respondent made it clear that he would be reinstated if he signed the contract". 
Also in Michael Peter Wilkin v Warwick Invest (Pty) Ltd 2013 ZALCCT 10 (30 April 
2013) paras 9, 12 the LC confirmed that this "provision has been interpreted by the 
Labour Appeal Court and Supreme Court of Appeal to confer limited protection – it 
applies if and only if the employer uses dismissal as a weapon to secure agreement 
to new terms and conditions of employment where the employer's purpose is to 
effect a dismissal that is reversible on accession by the employee to the employer's 
demand. On the facts disclosed by the stated case before me the applicant's 
dismissal was unconditional and irreversible". 
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dismissal to remove the distinction which has been drawn in the Game 
Discount World case and the Fry's Metals cases between strategic and 
permanent dismissals. It also does not say whether it has the intention of 
extending protection to employees, namely by covering all dismissals 
associated with the negotiation of matters of mutual interest; even if it 
occurs when a business is faced with economic extinction. 
The only clues that can be derived from the Memorandum of Objects: 
Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 are that the amendment aims to 
remove the anomaly arising from the Fry's Metals' interpretation of the 
definition of automatically unfair dismissal, and to give effect to the 
intention of the provision as enacted in 1995, which seeks to protect the 
integrity of the process of collective bargaining.77 
Going back to the intention of the policy maker that prevailed in 1995, the 
Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Ministerial Legal Task Team, 
199578 did not expand on the intention behind the removal of dismissal 
from the definition of lock-out or the inclusion of the definition of automatic 
unfair labour practice. However, the document does explain what it 
intended in the difficult area of collective bargaining in the face of the 
eradication of a business due to financial hardship: 
Where the strike conforms with the provisions of the draft Bill there is an 
absolute prohibition on the dismissal of strikers. … Careful consideration 
was given to allowing an employer to dismiss where there may be 
irreparable harm caused by the strike. … The draft Bill offers the employer 
facing bankruptcy three options – 
 resolve the dispute; 
 employ alternative labour; 
 dismiss on grounds of operational requirements.79 
It is disquieting that this focus on insolvency and operational requirement 
dismissals never made its way into the LRA of 1995. In his contribution 
Thompson writes that if one were to ask "many in the trade union 
leadership" what the original intention behind section 187(1)(c) of the LRA 
of 1995 was, they would say that all matters of mutual interest "should be 
determined solely by the collective bargaining process" and if, with their 
available collective bargaining weaponry 
                                            
77  Memorandum of Objects: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 17. Emphasis 
added. 
78  Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Ministerial Legal Task Team 1995 ILJ 
278. 
79  Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Ministerial Legal Task Team 1995 ILJ 
305. 
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… employers cannot induce acceptance of their demands for altered terms 
and conditions of employment, then the status quo must live on.80 
But this, according to Thompson, would not "serve industrial society 
well".81 He suggested that it should be permissible for disputes to migrate 
from the collective bargaining sphere (disputes of interest) to questions of 
right in instances where the employer's decision has been formulated on a 
"sensible business analysis that has been probed in the consultative 
process".82 
We argue that the absence of this qualification results in uncertainty in this 
area of the law and leaves the clash between sections 188(1) and 
187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995 exposed. 
6.2 Effect of the amendment on the Fry's Metals dichotomy 
Even though it is not clearly stated, the amendment appears to be at pains 
to shift the focus away from the employer's intention behind the dismissal - 
to compel employees to accept a demand. Therefore, the ambit of 
automatically unfair dismissal has thus been extended to cover all 
situations where employees are dismissed for refusing to accept 
amendments to their conditions of service, irrespective of the employer's 
intent.83 Grogan fittingly states that the effect of this amendment is that an 
automatically unfair dismissal now occurs simply because the employer 
has made a demand which the employees refused to accept. It has 
become irrelevant whether or not the dismissal or threat thereof was 
intended to induce the employees to comply.84 
Does the amendment resolve the issues which emerged in the Fry's 
Metals cases? Remember that here, both the LAC and SCA placed a 
great deal of emphasis on whether or not the employer intended to compel 
or coerce the employees to accede to a demand.85 If this was not the 
case, such as in the event of the permanent termination on the ground of 
operational requirements, these dismissals fell beyond the scope of 
automatically unfair dismissals. The upshot of this was that it could, 
potentially so, be deemed to be a fair termination under the provisions of 
                                            
80  Thompson 2006 ILJ 729.  
81  Thompson 1999 ILJ 770. 
82  Thompson 1999 ILJ 770. Also see Fry's Metals, SCA 707. 
83  Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work 258. 
84  Grogan Workplace Law 216. 
85  So, for example, in Fry's Metals, LAC para 27 it was held that a "dismissal must 
have as its purpose the compulsion of the employees concerned to accept a 
demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest between employer and employee. If 
a dismissal is not for that purpose, it falls outside the ambit of s 187(1)(c)". 
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operational requirements dismissals.86 On this basis the LAC concluded 
that if a dismissal is final the purpose cannot be to compel workers to 
accept a demand which falls in the ambit of disputes of interest.87 
To us, it is clear that had the amended section been in place at the time of 
the Fry's Metals decisions, the LAC's and SCA's reasoning would not have 
prevailed, as there would have been no question as to whether or not the 
purpose or reason for the dismissal was to compel the employees to 
accept a demand. Instead it would have resulted in a decision that the 
dismissals were impermissible on the ground of their being automatically 
unfair, irrespective of whether they were permanent or temporary 
dismissals. 
However, this does not resolve the entire issue. Whilst the amendment 
eliminates the distinction drawn by the LAC and the SCA between 
conditional and final dismissals, the important question remains whether it 
is still permissible at all for an employer to dismiss employees on 
operational grounds should they refuse to accede to the employer's 
demands for amendments to their conditions of service. Would it, for 
example, be possible for an employer who is facing economic capitulation 
to enter negotiations with employees about the amendment of their 
conditions of employment to save a sinking ship? It is instructive that the 
Memorandum of Objects: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 makes 
no mention of the approach of the Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by 
the Ministerial Legal Task Team, 1995 that operational requirement 
dismissals should be permissible when an employer is facing 
bankruptcy.88 
6.3 Can an employer still dismiss for operational requirements? 
In our view, there is a crossing point between collective bargaining and 
operational requirements dismissals where the provisions of the LRA of 
1995 clash. This aspect which the Fry's Metals cases had to deal with has 
                                            
86  Sections 188(1) and 189 of the LRA of 1995. 
87  Fry's Metals, LAC para 35 took heed of the manner in which the respondents set out 
the basis of their challenge against the dismissals. The LAC held that the 
respondents did not in their founding affidavit allege that in dismissing the 
employees, the appellant sought to compel them to agree to the changes it was 
proposing. The Court went on to hold that the respondents instead, alleged that the 
appellant was proposing to dismiss the employees as a result of their failure to agree 
to changes to their terms and conditions of employment. This, the court held, was 
not the same. 
88  Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Ministerial Legal Task Team 1995 ILJ 
278 305. 
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not been resolved by the LRAA of 2014.89 After the amendment, the 
provisions in the LRA of 1995 which regulate dismissals for operational 
requirements remain unchanged. The definition of "operational 
requirements"90 has not been qualified to indicate that such dismissals are 
no longer permissible where employees refuse to accept a demand in 
respect of a matter of mutual interest. Nor have policymakers released 
employers from their statutory obligation to "engage in a meaningful joint 
consensus-seeking process in an attempt to reach consensus" about 
measures to "avoid", "minimise" or "mitigate" the number of dismissals 
before proceeding with dismissals on the ground of operational 
requirements.91 This could arguably include changing conditions of service 
during the process of dismissal on the ground of operational requirements 
to ensure the survival of a business. 
Another overlooked aspect is the fact that policymakers continue to 
endorse the right of an employer to dismiss employees participating in a 
protected strike for reasons based on the employer's operational 
requirements.92 The right to strike forms an integral and uncontested 
element of disputes of interest and collective bargaining.93 In South African 
Chemical Workers Union v Afrox,94 Landman J of the LC explicitly 
recognised that there are two exceptions to the prohibition on the 
dismissal of workers engaged in a protected strike action, the first 
misconduct, and the second relating to the economic foundations of 
employment. Here, Landman J held that: 
Although we may speak of the right to a job, this right is itself dependent, at 
least in the private sector, on the existence in economic terms of the 
enterprise. The enterprise which provides the employment must maintain its 
way, grow and prosper for the right to a job to have a meaning. If it fails then 
the right to a job fails with it. Economics dictates that if it is necessary to 
shed jobs so that the enterprise may survive or alter or adapt its business 
                                            
89  Grogan 2003 ELL 6 further states that "Fry's Metals, therefore, illustrates a classic 
conflict between the employer's right to dismiss for operational requirements 
(provided, of course, a fair procedure is followed) and the employee's right not to be 
dismissed in order to be induced to comply with an employer's demand". 
90  Section 213 of the LRA of 1995.  
91  Section 189(2) of the LRA of 1995. In our view, such consultations are closely 
related to the process of collective bargaining. 
92  Section 67(5) of the LRA of 1995 provides that the LRA of 1995 does "not preclude 
an employer from fairly dismissing an employee" engaged in a protected strike for "a 
reason based on the employer's operational requirements". 
93  NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 2 BLLR 103 (CC). It was held (para 67) that the 
"right to strike is essential to the process of collective bargaining. It is what makes 
collective bargaining work. It is to the process of bargaining what an engine is to a 
motor vehicle". 
94  South African Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1998 ILJ 62 (LC). This point of 
view was endorsed by the LAC in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 ILJ 
1718 (LAC) para 29. 
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then so be it. This basic economic premise has been incorporated in the Act 
by way of the exception permitting dismissal for operational requirements.95 
Although this case concerned the dismissal of striking workers for 
operational requirements, it is relevant to the topic under discussion, as 
like the question being analysed in this instance, it involved the use of a 
rights-based remedy (dismissal) to address issues that were the subject of 
collective bargaining (an interest-based dispute).96 
This illustrates that notwithstanding the undisputed importance of 
collective bargaining, economic circumstances cannot be ignored. The law 
needs to be implemented in a manner that recognises the commercial 
principle which accepts that the need may be justified to dismiss 
employees where the survival of the business is at stake. As fittingly 
pointed out by Todd and Damant, although distributive issues which 
impact on the economic viability and success of an enterprise may initially 
form the subject of collective bargaining, it may in time become the subject 
of retrenchments.97 Despite the problems which the SCA in the Fry's 
Metals98 case had with the migration of disputes, it is evident that while 
there is a large degree of separation between rights and interest disputes, 
there are instances where they intersect.99 One example is collective 
bargaining and dismissal for operational requirements.100 
Taking account of statutory provisions which direct employers to 
participate in "a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process in an attempt 
to reach consensus" before employees may be retrenched and the right to 
dismiss on operational requirements during a protected strike, it is doubtful 
that the purpose of the current section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995 is to 
                                            
95  SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 ILJ 1718 (LAC) para 66. 
96  With reference to the subsequent appeal case Cohen 2004 ILJ 1895 alludes to the 
fact that in "Afrox the Labour Appeal Court confirmed that in some cases, where the 
employer is faced with economic collapse as a result of a strike, it may be fair to use 
retrenchment to conform interest disputes into rights disputes. Similarly in the 
context of a restructuring exercise, which is essentially an interest dispute and which 
must commence at the bargaining arena, it may become necessary to resort to 
retrenchment dismissals when collective bargaining fails". 
97  Todd and Damant 2004 ILJ 912. 
98  Fry's Metals, SCA. It was held (para 59) that "[i]n our view neither s 187(1)(c) nor the 
collective bargaining structure of the statute as a whole contemplates the 'migration' 
of disputes from one part of the LRA's taxonomy to another". 
99  Todd and Damant 2004 ILJ 913. The authors confirm that "[n]o conceptual 
distinction can properly be drawn between matters of mutual interest and the 
'matters' that cause employers to contemplate retrenchments. All of these matters 
impact ultimately on the 'wage-work bargain' and should (or may) be discussed in 
the same process of engagement between management and labour. It is therefore 
artificial to talk of the 'migration' of engagement from the arena of bargaining to the 
arena of dismissal". 
100  Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work 446. 
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outlaw dismissals for operational requirements in totality. However, what 
policy makers failed to do during the latest round of amendments, was to 
provide clarity about when these dismissals may still be acceptable.101 
It should, however, be stressed that the approach alluded to above, which 
confirms that operational requirements dismissals in the wake of collective 
bargaining have not been abolished, does not imply that it can be followed 
in every situation where employees refuse to agree to proposed changes. 
The central question that needs to be answered is whether the reason for 
the dismissal is due to the refusal by the employees to accept the 
proposed demand, or whether it is based on genuine operational 
reasons.102 
There is the counter-argument to the right to dismiss on the grounds of 
operational requirements based on the proposition that there is adequate 
machinery provided for in the LRA of 1995 to resolve interest disputes.103 
We disagree with this. Firstly, the option for employers to rely on the lock-
out as a collective bargaining tool was watered down in the LRA of 1995 
as the definition of lock-outs was amended to exclude all forms of 
dismissal.  
Secondly, employers taking the initiative in collective bargaining are 
precluded from relying on replacement labour during lock-outs.104 
Replacement workers may be relied on only if employers lock-out in 
response to a strike.105 
With the implementation of the LRAA of 2014, the legislature has made no 
attempt to formulate a new equilibrium within the collective bargaining 
framework for employers and employees which may have provided room 
for abolishing operational requirement dismissals in the context of 
                                            
 101  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 435-436. Also see Van Niekerk and Smit 
Law@work 258, where it is stated that if "the employer dismisses because the 
employee refuses to accept a changed shift configuration, there seems to be nothing 
to preclude the employer from dismissing the employee for a reason related to its 
operational requirements if its true intention is to replace employees with others who 
are willing to work according to the new configuration". 
102  In Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2004 ILJ 2156 (LAC) para 
48. The LAC indicated that where employees refuse to accept proposed changes to 
terms and conditions of employment, this does not mean that the employer can 
never effect the desired changes. While it is impermissible to dismiss in order to 
compel employees to accept a demand, the employer has the right to invoke the 
provisions of s 189 provided the necessary requirements of the section are met. 
103  So for example, Fry's Metals, LC para 37. Here the employer is criticised for avoiding 
implementing a lock-out to persuade its employees to accede to its demands. 
104  Section 76(1)(a) of the LRA of 1995. Technikon SA v NUTESA 2001 1 BLLR 46 
(LAC). 
105  Section 76(1)(b) of the LRA of 1995.  
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collective bargaining. Considering the current structure of the LRA of 
1995, with all of its permissible weaponry, an interpretation of automatic 
unfair dismissal that disallows dismissals for operational requirements in 
its totality is not sustainable and disavows business imperatives in an 
increasingly competitive environment. 
6.4 The impact of section 187(1)(c) on dismissals for increased 
profits 
While it has been argued that in principle the purely profit-enhancing 
reduction of staff fell foul of the former section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 
1995,106 the LAC in Fry's Metals found that the LRA of 1995 does not 
distinguish between dismissals for operational reasons intended to save a 
business from failure and those intended simply to increase profitability. 
As alluded to by Zondo JP: 
This is because all the Act refers to, and recognises, in this regard is an 
employer's right to dismiss for a reason based on its operational 
requirements without making any distinction between operational 
requirements in the context of a business the survival of which is under 
threat and a business which is making profit and wants to make more 
profit.107 
This approach was accepted by Nicholson JA in General Food Industries v 
FAWU when he held:  
I am of the view that a natural consequence of the Fry's Metals judgment is 
that, all things being equal, a company is entitled to insist by economic 
restructuring that a profitable centre becomes even more profitable. The Act 
recognises an employer's right to dismiss for a reason based on its 
operational requirements without making any distinction in the context of a 
business the survival of which is under threat and a business which is 
making profit and wants to make profit.108 
It is clear that there has been no change to the definition of operational 
requirements in section 213 of the LRA of 1995 and the previous 
pronouncements by the LAC continue to be relevant in 2016.109 
However, the expansive interpretation of operational requirement 
dismissals can have detrimental consequences if not dealt with 
appropriately. It is for this reason that the courts have a crucial role to play 
                                            
106  Thompson 1999 ILJ 766.  
107  Fry's Metals, LAC para 33 held "that neither Thompson in his article nor counsel in 
his argument has pointed to any provision in the Act that can be relied upon to make 
this distinction". Also see Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 
2004 ILJ 2156 (LAC) para 57. 
108  General Food Industries Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union 2004 ILJ 1260 (LAC) 
para 52. 
109  See, for example, South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v G4S Aviation 
Secure Solutions 2016 ZALCJHB 10 (13 January 2016) paras 21-22. 
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in unearthing the true reason for the dismissal and ensuring that fairness 
prevails. In this regard, Du Toit110 points out that: 
… though the notion of employers being free to dismiss workers "merely to 
increase profit" may seem to open the floodgates to dismissal virtually at will, 
the causal nexus between a dismissal and the employer's operational needs 
must still pass the test of fairness. The real question remains: will it be fair in 
the given circumstances to dismiss employees in order to increase profit or 
efficiency?111 
As previously indicated, the line between an automatically unfair dismissal 
for refusing to accept changed terms and conditions of employment and a 
legitimate dismissal on the grounds of an employer's operational 
requirements will often be a fine one. There can be no doubt that the 
responsibility to determine where the line should be drawn on a case-by-
case basis continues to rest on the shoulders of the labour courts.112 
7 The appropriate test and concluding remarks 
There is a need to allow for the use of dismissals in certain instances 
where there is a refusal to accept proposed changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment. The scheme of the LRA of 1995 
accommodates this, and a holistic consideration of all the relevant sources 
of law, as discussed in this article, finds no authority to suggest that 
section 187(1)(c) in its current form should not be interpreted in a manner 
that permits the use of operational requirement dismissals. 
However, this should by no means give employers carte blanche in 
utilising this remedy. It would be imprudent to trust that this avenue will 
always be used in a conscientious and apposite manner, especially 
considering that it is justifiable to dismiss for operational requirements in 
order to become more profitable. As such, the courts play an essential role 
in ensuring that fairness prevails, and that disguised retrenchments do not 
take place within the employment arena where collective bargaining 
should prevail. Fairness has become the hallmark, or essence, of labour 
                                            
110  Du Toit 2005 ILJ 602 confirms that the "term operational requirements, as defined in 
s 213, is broad enough to include every conceivable business consideration that 
might lead an employer to consider dismissal in the context of restructuring" and this 
could even include the quest to increase profits. 
111  Du Toit 2005 ILJ 606. Also see at 602, where Du Toit states that the word "fair" 
introduces the following vital qualification: "Though seldom considered explicitly by 
the courts and frequently taken for granted, it is this concept – rather than the 
presence or absence of an operational basis for the employer's decision - that lies at 
the heart of most disputes about substantive fairness". 
112  Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work 258. 
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law and practice and it does not merely serve as a moral adjunct 
thereto.113 As aptly captured by Thompson:114 
[t]he courts … should regard the operational requirements claim with a 
healthy measure of scepticism, and use the fairness filter to sort the chaff 
from the corn. 
We contend that the courts are compelled to apply an objective test in 
their quest to determine fairness in the narrow permissible zone of 
dismissals in the context of collective bargaining.115 As confirmed by 
Zondo JP in Algrorax, when courts are seized with a dismissal dispute, the 
court must determine the fairness of the dismissal objectively and: 
… must not defer to the employer for the purpose of answering that 
question. In other words it cannot say that the employer thinks it is fair, and 
therefore, it is or should be fair.116 
It is our view that the test which the LAC applied in SA Chemical Workers 
Union v Afrox Ltd117 in determining the true reason for the dismissal in the 
context of strikes and retrenchments is also the appropriate test to be 
applied in the intersection between automatically unfair and operational 
requirement dismissals. Froneman DJP stated that the courts must: 
… determine factual causation: was participation or support, of the protected 
strike a sine qua non (pre-requisite) for the dismissal? Put another way, 
would the dismissal have occurred if there was no participation or support of 
the strike? If the answer is yes, then the dismissal is not automatically unfair. 
If the answer is no, that does not immediately render the dismissal 
automatically unfair; the next issue is one of legal causation, namely whether 
such participation or conduct was the "main" or "dominant", or "proximate", 
or "most likely" cause of the dismissal.118 
In applying this test to section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995, the question 
that must be asked is whether the dismissal would have occurred if there 
had been no refusal by the employees to accept the demand proposed by 
the employer. If the answer is yes, the dismissal is not automatically 
unfair. If the answer is no, then one would proceed to the issue of legal 
causation in order to determine whether the refusal by the employees was 
or was not the most likely cause of the dismissal. In answering this 
question, the facts and circumstances of the dismissals will have to be 
                                            
113  Afrox case para 22. 
114  Thompson 2006 ILJ 710. 
115  This was confirmed in Fry's Metals, LC para 37. 
116  Algorax case para 69. 
117  SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
118  SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 ILJ 1718 (LAC) para 32. 
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objectively assessed and evaluated in order to establish the most probable 
inference that can be drawn.119 
The legislature can be criticised for not being more articulate about the 
purpose of the amendment of section 187(1)(c) of the LRA of 1995. Such 
clarification would have been apt against the background that no 
amendments were made to the provisions which permit operational 
requirement dismissals. The continued obscurity could readily have been 
removed by including further detail in the wording of the LRA of 1995 or 
the Code on Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements. 
The amended provision could have clarified that a dismissal is 
automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is a refusal by 
employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest 
between them and their employer. However, this does not preclude 
dismissals for operational requirements, which are dealt with and 
permitted in further sections of the LRA of 1995. In addition to this, the 
policymakers should have considered giving effect to the suggestions 
made in the Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Ministerial Legal 
Task Team, 1995 in order to narrow the scope of permissible operational 
requirements in the context of collective bargaining. Legitimate 
retrenchments could have been limited to exclude instances where the 
employer seeks to improve profits, but to cover instance where employers 
are warding off insolvency. 
Even in the absence of these suggested amendments, it is suggested that 
the principle that employers are permitted to retrench employees with a 
view to increasing profits should be reassessed with a healthy measure of 
scepticism. It is suggested that such a retrenchment should be permitted 
only if an employer is able to discharge a higher level of proof and 
scrutiny. The courts should not shy away from their responsibility of 
determining fairness – even if this entails second guessing employers' 
business decisions. 
                                            
119  Case law illustrates that courts are playing an interrogative role in this regard. In 
South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v G4S Aviation Secure Solutions 
2016 ZALCJHB 10 (13 January 2016) para 22 the court considered the arguments 
and evidence that were adduced that the employer acted in bad faith when effecting 
the retrenchments, or that it had sought to serve an ulterior motive. However, on the 
evidence the court could find no reason to indicate that the decision of the employer 
was not commercially rational. A similar approach was followed in South African 
Commercial and Catering Workers Union obo J Bheki v Entabeni Private Game 
Lodge (Pty) Ltd 2015 ZALCJHB 410 (18 November 2015); Bifawu & SACCAWU obo 
PV Mpanza v Zurich Insurance Company South Africa 2015 ZALCJHB 141 (23 April 
2015). 
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